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seems unlikely that the Missouri courts would enter the school financing
for any reason short of a ficontroversy on a deficiency clause theory
74
nancially compelled school shutdown.
PAUL M. BROWN

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- STRIKING
TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES
WHO REFUSE TO ANSWER ON
CROSS-EXAMINATION
State v. Carlos'
State v. Brown 2
William Carlos was prosecuted for first degree murder, charged
with hiring one Patrick McGuire to kill the victim. McGuire testified for
the state in return for a reduced charge of second degree murder; he
was serving his sentence at the time of Carlos' trial. McGuire testified as
to the murder contract allegedly made with Carlos and as to his own
activities the night of the killing. McGuire stated that a man had accompanied him on the night of the murder, but that the other man had
waited outside and had not participated.
On cross-examination, Carlos' attorney attempted to elicit the name
of McGuire's companion in order to pursue the defense theory that
McGuire's only motive in killing the victim was robbery. McGuire refused to answer, and the trial court held him in contempt. Because
McGuire was already in prison, that sanction had no effect. The defendant's motions for a mistrial or a continuance were denied by the trial
court, and Carlos was convicted of murder.
On appeal Carlos claimed that McGuire's refusal to answer on
cross-examination had deprived him of his right to confront the wit74. In Concerned Parents v. Caruthersville School Dist., 548 S.W.2d 554
(Mo. En Banc 1977), the Missouri Supreme Court held that a suit challenging
the charging of tuition by the Caruthersville public school district properly stated
a cause of action under the Missouri Constitution, art. 9, § 1(a) (establishingfree
public schools). The court declined to rule on the state equal protection claim
raised by the appellants but noted that it would be considered if on remand the
circuit court determined that article 9, § 1(a) permits public schools to require its
pupils to furnish their own materials and equipment. 548 S.W.2d at 563.
1. 549 S.W.2d 330 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
2. 549 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. En Banc 1977).
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nesses against him, as guaranteed in both the United States and Missouri
Constitutions. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
The court found that as to the murder contract, Carlos had had full
exercise of his right to cross-examine McGuire. The court also found
that because both the state and the defendant knew the probable identity
of the man who accompanied McGuire, the witness' refusal to answer
did not substantially limit the defendant's right of cross-examination.
The court suggested that had the defendant so moved, striking that part
of McGuire's testimony which concerned the actual commission of the
murder might have been a proper remedy.
Irvin Brown was prosecuted for armed robbery. One of the three
men allegedly involved in the hold-up, James Moore, had already
pleaded guilty to the charge. Moore was the defendant Brown's sole witness. On direct examination Moore testified that he was one of the men
involved in the robbery and that the defendant did not participate. On
cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Moore for the names of the
other men who had committed the robbery. Moore replied that he had
committed the robbery with John Green, who was deceased, and another
man. The prosecutor repeatedly asked him to name the third man, but
Moore refused for fear of reprisal against his family. As a sanction for
his refusal to answer on cross-examination, the trial court ordered
Moore's entire testimony stricken from the record.
On appeal Brown contended that by striking the testimony of his
only witness the trial court had deprived him of his constitutional right
to present witnesses in his favor. The Missouri Supreme Court held that
striking Moore's testimony was an abuse of discretion by the trial court
and remanded the case for a new trial. The court stated that the prosecution already knew the identity of the third man and that therefore
the only purpose of the state's cross-examination was to test Moore's
credibility. It was not within the discretion of the trial court to deprive
the defendant of his only witness under these circumstances.
The Missouri Supreme Court adopted the suggestions of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals for dealing with witnesses who refuse to answer
material questions on cross-examination. In United States v. Cardillo3 the
Third Circuit offered three alternatives for dealing with such witnesses
depending on the degree of harm likely to result from the witness' refusal. First, if the testimony sought is so closely related to the issues in
the trial as to deny the opposing party his right of cross-examination, the
witness' entire testimony should be excised from the record. If, however,
the testimony refused concerns only one aspect of the case, the court
should strike only that part of the witness' direct testimony which deals
with that subject. Finally, if the cross-examiner's questions deal with
matters collateral to the issues in the trial, such as the witness' credibility,

3. 316 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822 (1963)..
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the court should not strike the witness' testimony on direct and instead
should instruct the jury to consider the witness' refusal to answer in assessing his credibility.
The right to cross-examine an opposing party's witnesses has always
been a fundamental tool for testing the truth of testimony. When a witness denies a party this right by refusing to answer relevant questions,
the traditional solution has been to excise all of that witness' testimony
from the record. 4 The application of this rule to civil cases has been
relatively free from controversy. The right to cross-examine the opponent's witnesses is absolute, and a denial or undue restriction of it is
5
reversible error.
Carlos and Brown demonstrate that a trial court in a criminal case
must exercise extreme caution in deciding whether to strike the testimony of an uncooperative witness. The problem involves two distinct
sixth amendment rights: when the uncooperative witness testifies for the
state, failure to impose sanctions for his refusal to answer on crossexamination may constitute a denial of the defendant's right to confront
the witnesses against him; on the other hand, striking the testimony of a
defense witness who refuses to answer the prosecutor's questions may
deny the defendant his right to present witnesses in his favor. The problem is further complicated by the status of the uncooperative witness,
i.e., whether the witness is the defendant himself or a nonparty witness
testifying for the state or for the defendant. The use of sanctions in each
of these situations will be discussed below.
A prosecution witness who refuses to answer the defendant's questions may prejudice the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. 6 The United States Supreme Court has held that the right of confrontation includes the right to cross-examine opposing witnesses 7 and
that the rights of confrontation and of cross-examination are binding on
state courts through the fourteenth amendment. 8 In Smith v. Illinois9
the sole witness in a prosecution for a narcotics sale refused to disclose
his real name on cross-examination. The Supreme Court held that the
trial court's failure to impose sanctions on the witness was an unconstitutional denial of the right of confrontation.
4. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 19, at 43 (2d ed. 1972); 5 J. WIGMoRE, Evi§ 1371, at 55 (Chadbourn Rev. 1974).
5. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Stewart, 164 F.2d 841 (8th Cir. 1947);
Pettus v. Casey, 358 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1962).
6. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...to be
confronted with the witnesses against him .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI; "[T]he
accused shall have the right ...to meet the witnesses against him face to face
" Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 18(a).
7. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474 (1959); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931); Kirby v. United States,
174 U.S. 47 (1899); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
8. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
9. 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
DENCE
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The Court has not attempted to establish guidelines for trial judges
in dealing with witnesses who refuse to answer questions on crossexamination, but most federal courts' 0 and a few state courts" have
joined Missouri in following the suggestions of the Third Circuit in
United States v. Cardillo. In that case several co-defendants were convicted
of receiving goods with knowledge that they were stolen from interstate
commerce. Two government witnesses refused to answer questions on
cross-examination, and the defendants asserted on appeal that the failure of the court to strike the entire testimony of these witnesses violated
their right of confrontation. One pleaded the fifth amendment when the
defendants attempted to impeach his testimony with evidence of prior
crimes. The Third Circuit found no error in the trial court's refusal to
strike this witness' testimony on direct and held that the refused questions concerned only the witness' credibility and were collateral to the
issues at trial. The government's other witness refused to disclose the
source of money used to buy the allegedly stolen goods. The court
found that the failure to strike this witness' direct testimony was reversible error, because the source of the money was central to the issues in
the case and such inquiries "might have established untruthfulness with
respect to specific events of the crime charged." "1 The Cardillo opinion
is written in terms of the defendant's remedies when a prosecution witness fails to answer questions on cross-examination. A trial judge in this
situation is under great pressure to impose sanctions because failure to
do so might amount to a denial of the defendant's confrontation right
under the sixth amendment, as in Smith v. Illinois.
A major concern of a trial court when confronted with an uncooperative witness is deciding which of the three situations and related
sanctions suggested in Cardillo apply. The court must attempt to weigh
the possible probative value of the defendant's questions in deciding
whether to strike all, part, or none of the witness' direct testimony or to
merely instruct the jury on the witness' credibility. The difficult problem
in the Cardillo analysis is separating material issues from those that are
merely collateral; the application of one of these labels will guide the
court in deciding which sanction is proper in a given situation.
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that the distinction between material and collateral issues is not always clear. That court stated that "the
question in each case must finally be whether the defendant's inability to
make the inquiry created a substantial danger of prejudice by depriving
10. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1974); Coil v.
United States, 343 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 821 (1966);
Dixon v. United States, 333 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1964).
11. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Hartman, 246 Cal. App. 2d 756, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 144 (1966); State v. Montanez, 215 Kan. 67, 523 P.2d 410 (1974); People v.
Schneider, 44 App. Div. 2d 845, 356 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1974); Commonwealth v.
Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 234 A.2d 552 (1967).
12. 316 F.2d at 613.
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him of the ability to test the truth of the witness's direct testimony." 13
This statement is misleading because it suggests that questions which
bear on the general credibility of a witness, such as inquiries about prior
crimes and bad character commonly used to impeach, are material. On
the contrary, most confrontation cases have held such lines of questioning to be collateral. 1 4 Hence, the proper focus of the Cardillo analysis is
the defendant's ability to test the specific damning statements made on
direct examination, rather than the witness' credibility or character in
general. In addition the Supreme Court has held that certain basic facts
which enable the defendant to probe the witness' background, such as
the witness' true name 15 and residence,16 are to be considered material
for purposes of cross-examination. Obviously questions of materiality
vary widely with the facts of each case; Missouri appellate courts gener17
ally have upheld the discretion of the trial court in this area.
Besides the distinction between collateral and material issues, trial
courts may face other problems in deciding whether to impose sanctions
on an uncooperative witness. When a prosecution witness fails to answer
the defendant's questions because of an alleged lapse of memory, at least
one court has held that it is not necessary to impose sanctions.1 8 Because the practical effect of a failure to answer is the same regardless of
the witness' motive, this result may be an unconstitutional denial of
cross-examination. Striking all or part of that witness' direct testimony
would not punish the witness if he honestly cannot remember some
material fact, but it would remove the potential prejudicial effect of his

13. Fountain v. United States, 384 F.2d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1005 (1968).
14. United States v. Stephens, 492 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
852 (1974); United States v. Dono, 428 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
829 (1970); Coil v. United States, 343 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 821 (1966); United States v. Smith, 342 F.2d 525 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 913 (1965); United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 822 (1963); State v. Hill, 434 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1968); State v. Messley,
366 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. 1963); State v. Cox, 360 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1962). Contra,
United States v. Garrett, 542 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Newman,
490 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1974); State v. Summers, 506 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1974).
15. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
16. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931). But see United States v.
Saletko, 452 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1040 (1972) (where
the disclosure of the witness' address may endanger his life, such disclosure is
not necessary); United States v. Battaglia, 432 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).
17. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 434 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1968); State v. Messley, 366
S.W.2d 390 (Mo. 1963); State v. Cox, 360 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1962); State v. Winn,
324 S.W.2d 637 (Mo. 1959).
18. United States v. Infelice, 506 F.2d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1107 (1975) (the defendant "was not deprived of the right to test the
knowledgeability and credibility" of the witness).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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testifying fully on direct while failing to answer relevant questions on
cross-examination.
Another problem can arise when a witness asserts his fifth amendment right to refuse to answer potentially incriminating questions on
cross-examination. When the witness' privilege against self incrimination
conflicts with the defendant's right of confrontation, the court first
should ascertain whether the witness is within his rights in refusing to
answer.' 9 If not, the court should direct the witness to answer and impose sanctions if he refuses. If the witness has properly invoked his
rights, the trial judge must consider the prejudicial effect of the failure
to answer in deciding whether the witness' direct testimony should go to
the jury. The ultimate question is still whether the testimony sought
pertains to material or collateral issues. If the witness is within his rights
and the answers refused would be collateral or cumulative, the proper
remedy under Cardillo is to call the jury's attention to the refusal to answer as bearing on credibility. If the testimony would concern some
material issue, the witness' direct testimony should be partially or com20
pletely stricken.
The uncooperative prosecution witness poses a complex problem in
light of the defendant's right of confrontation. The converse problem,
where a defense witness refuses to submit to cross-examination by the
state, is even more difficult and fraught with potential error, as illustrated by State v. Brown. The prosecution has a right to cross-examine
defense witnesses. 2 ' Considerations of mutuality seem to dictate that a
defense witness who withholds relevant testimony on cross-examination
should be subject to the same sanctions as a prosecution witness in a
similar situation. However, the imposition of sanctions on a defense witness may interfere with the defendant's right to produce witnesses in his
favor, a right guaranteed in both the Missouri and the United States
Constitutions.2 2 The United States Supreme Court has long recognized
that the right of a defendant "to have compulsory process for obtaining
19. Fountain v. United States, 384 F.2d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1005 (1968).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Brierly, 501 F.2d 1024 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1052 (1974) (source of gun used in other robberies held collateral);
United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1974) (where the defendant was
charged with conspiring with the government's witness to place wiretaps, the
failure to impose sanctions when witness refused to answer questions about
wiretaps placed by witness alone was reversible error); Fountain v. United States,
384 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1005 (1968) (source of money
witness used in buying drugs from the defendant held collateral).
21. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S.
301 (1895); Brown v. United States, 234 F.2d 140 (6th Cir. 1956).
22. "[T]he accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor ....
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. "[T]he accused
shall have the right ... to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
his behalf .... " Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 18(a).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss2/8
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witnesses in his favor" means that the defendant must be allowed to present his witnesses and evidence without undue restriction by the state. 3
The sixth amendment right to present witnesses is binding on the states
24
through the fourteenth amendment.

Instances where a trial court strikes the testimony of a defense witness are extremely rare; the question in Brown was one of first impression in Missouri. 25 A leading federal case is Wisconsin ex rel. Monsoor v.
Gagnon,26 a habeas corpus review of a state prosecution for the sale of
marijuana. Monsoor's roommate testified for the defense but invoked
the fifth amendment when the state attempted to impeach his testimony
by asking about his own use of drugs. The trial court struck the roommate's entire testimony, and the state supreme court affirmed on the
ground that the striking was not prejudicial error. 27 The Seventh Circuit reversed and stated: "[I]t is constitutionally impermissible to strike
relevant and competent direct examination testimony where a defense
witness on cross-examination invokes the privilege against self-incrimination with respect to collateral questions which relate only to his credibility and do not concern the subject matter of his direct examination." 28
Where the defendant has been deprived of his sixth amendment
right to present witnesses, the courts usually have limited the defendant's
presentation of evidence by some method other than striking testimony. 29 The state's right to cross-examine the defendant's witnesses is
based on a notion of fair play rather than on any constitutional provision, and courts have been aware of the great potential for error in
30
striking defense testimony.
The decision to strike testimony also may hinge in part on whether
the witness is the defendant himself or a nonparty. The imposition of
23. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (codefendant blocked by statute

from testifying as to the innocence of the other in a prosecution for murder;
statute held unconstitutional); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (defendant convicted summarily of contempt by a one man secret grand jury, with no opportunity to present a defense).
24. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
25. 549 S.W.2d at 342.
26. 497 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1974).
27. State v. Monsoor, 56 Wis. 2d 689, 203 N.W.2d 20 (1973).
28. 497 F.2d at 1129-30.
29. See, e.g., Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (trial judge repeatedly
threatened defendant's witness with dire consequences for perjury before he
began testimony, the witness subsequently refused to testify); Bray v. Peyton, 429
F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1970) (where the defendant in a statutory rape prosecution
offered witnesses to show that complainant was a "lewd and consenting" female,
which would reduce the charge to a misdemeanor, the prosecutor had one of the
defendant's witnesses arrested for statutory rape as he sat in court; the other
witnesses then refused to testify).
30. State v. Brown, 549 S.W.2d at 346.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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sanctions for refusal to answer on a defendant testifying for himself is
more common and justifiable than the use of sanctions against a nonparty defense witness.31 When the defendant elects to testify on his own
behalf, the decision to refuse to answer on cross-examination is his own.
This is not true of a nonparty defense witness. Although punishment of
the defendant is not the rationale behind the sanction of striking testimony, 32 the practical effect is almost inevitably harmful to the defendant's case. Striking the testimony of a nonparty defense witness is
therefore a sanction against the defendant for the offense of the witness.3 3 Except where the testimony is cumulative or otherwise unimportant to the defendant's case, the total striking of a defense witness'
testimony is difficult to justify.
With the adoption of the sanctions suggested in Cardillo, trial judges
in Missouri have four methods of dealing with a witness who refuses to
give relevant testimony on cross-examination. The first is immediate imprisonment for contempt until the witness agrees to testify.3 4 This
sanction is ineffective where the witness already is serving a long prison
term, as in Brown and Carlos.
If imprisonment is ineffective, and the testimony refused is essential
to the opponent's case, or the witness completely refuses to submit to
any cross-examination, the trial judge may excise from the record all of
the witness' direct testimony. Where the effect of total striking would be
too severe in light of the nature and scope of the testimony refused, the
court has the option of Striking part of the witness' direct testimony.
This sanction would be particularly useful in a situation like Carlos,
where the witness testified about two distinct transactions, the making of
the murder contract and the commission of the crime. The witness refused testimony on only one of these subjects, the actual murder. The
trial judge could strike that portion of the witness' direct testimony that
related to the subjects which the witness refused to discuss on crossexamination.
Finally, the trial judge has the alternative of refusing to strike
direct testimony but instructing the jury that they may consider the
refusal in determining credibility where the witness refuses to testify
only as to collateral matters or the testimony refused would be
cumulative. This may be the only permissible sanction in a case like
Brown, where the testimony covered only one transaction and was not
susceptible to partial striking, and total striking would be an unconstitutional denial of the right to present witnesses. The Missouri Supreme Court noted in Brown that a jury instruction on the witness'

31.
32.
33.
34.

People v. Barthel, 231 Cal. App. 2d 827, 42 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1965).
People v. McGowan, 80 Cal. App. 293, 295, 251 P. 643 (1926).
549 S.W.2d at 343.
See § 491.020, RSMo 1969.
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